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Despite the strong and persistent influence of Gary Becker’s marriage model, the 
model does not completely explain the observed correlation between married 
women’s labor market participation and overall divorce rates. In this paper we 
show how a simple sociologically inspired extension of the model realigns the 
model’s predictions with the observed trends. The extension builds on Becker’s 
own claim that partners match on preference for partner specialization, and, as a 
novelty, on additional sociological theory claiming that preference coordination 
tend to happen subconsciously. When we incorporate this aspect into Becker’s 
model, the model provides predictions of divorce rates and causes that fit more 




During the last decades, developed countries have witnessed a substantial increase 
in married women’s labor market participation, along with a sharp increase in 
divorce rates. Gary S. Becker’s economic model of the marriage market (Becker 
1991; Becker, Landes and Michael 1977) provides a coherent explanation of this 
development, an explanation which has greatly influenced our understanding of 
marriage and the causes of divorce. Becker claims that the rise in women’s wages 
causes married couples to allocate more of the women’s time to paid labour, rather 
than to housework. Hereby the relative value of traits like housework efficiency 
drops, while the value of breadwinning efficiency rises. This produces a mismatch 
in marriages that are formed before and still exist during and after the transition of 
the social conditions: because of an imperfect correlation between domestic skills 
and market skills, suitable female partners in the ‘old’ matching regime are likely to 
be less suitable in the new regime. As a consequence, divorce rates increase. We 
find empirical evidence of this development in most western countries during the 
post World War II period. 
 
According to Becker’s model this social trend furthermore reduces the use of sex 
specific specialization in marriage, as well as the general gains from marriage. This 
then reduces the probabilities of marriage and remarriage after divorce. The 
prediction of decreased marriage rates is also somewhat consistent with the 
development observed in most western countries. As illustrated in figure 1, 
marriage rates show a slowly decreasing tendency in the US, UK and Sweden, from 
1970 till now; thus although there are fluctuations, especially for the UK, the 
evidence points to a reduced interest in marriage over time. In addition, the model’s 
prediction of reduced probabilities of marriage and remarriage is consistent with the 
findings of a number of empirical studies (see cites in the following sections).     
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The curves of the figure are based on data from OECD. 
 
A subtle implication of Becker’s model is that divorce rates return to their initial 
level once women’s labour market participation rates stabilise. Though there is a 
permanent reduction of the marital gains from specialisation and the fall in marriage 
and remarriage rates persist, a stabilization of the social conditions reduces the 
possibilities of mismatch and subsequent divorces between partners. Becker (1974) 
notes this implication himself and it is easy to derive. However, this implication of 
Becker’s theory has not yet materialized (see e.g. Schoen & Standish, 2001). Even 
though labour market participation rates for married women are stabilizing in a 
number of countries there are no indications of falling divorce rates. Figure 2 
illustrates the development in women’s labour market participation rates: here, we 
see how this rate increases from 1970 until the late 1980ies in both the US, UK and 
Sweden (note that our data from the UK is limited). After this period, the rate 
stabilizes at participation rates between 70 and 80 percent, where the UK has the 
lowest and Sweden the highest, but somewhat fluctuating, rate. Comparing figure 1 
and 2 demonstrates that marriage rates continue to drop in all three countries even 
after women’s labour market participation rates have stabilized. 
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 The curves of the figure are based on data from OECD, for U.S. evidence, see also Oppenheimer, 
1994, Oppenheimer, 1997a). 
 
Figure 3
1 illustrates the development in divorce rates. The three rates, for the US, 
the UK and Sweden, diverge, but there is a pattern of rising rates until the early 
1990ies, and stabilization thereafter, however with fluctuating rates for Sweden. 
Interestingly, the stabilization seems to occur simultaneously with the stabilization 
of women’s labour market participation rates shown in figure 2. Also, figure 3 show 
no indication of the declining divorce rates predicted by Becker’s model.  
 
                                                 
1 Note that the distance between the data-points at the x-axis changes in 1998 FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
 
  5




















































The curves of the figure are based on data from OECD. 
 
While the fall predicted by Becker’s model may potentially materializes in the 
future - the underlying system determining divorce is complex and may be 
subject to substantial time lags - these looming divergences make the search for 
other or additional explanations a relevant endeavour.  
  
The literature already proposes several extensions of Becker’s model (e.g. 
Chiappori & Weiss 2006; Lam 1988; Weiss 1997; Lich-Tyler, unpublished 
paper), however, we are aware of only one that accommodates the observed 
divorce rates: The study by Chiappori and Weiss (2006) suggests that a bigger 
market for remarrying partners reduces search costs. Their model implies that a 
temporary initial rise in divorce induces an equilibrium shift which increases the 
attractiveness of divorce permanently. Thus, this scenario is consistent with the 
actual development in divorce rates 
 
Our paper presents a different extension of Becker’s model. It builds on Becker’s 
own claim that in addition to partners’ matching on productivity traits, also FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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matching on preferences for partner specialization matters. The extension of 
Becker’s model presented by Chiappori and Weiss (2006) does not consider this 
claim, despite the convincing empirical evidence of its importance: A number of 
empirical studies question the importance of productivity based traits (e.g. Huber 
and Spitze, 1980; Sayer and Bianchi; 2000) and presents substantial empirical 
evidence that mismatched preferences on partner specialization is a major cause 
of marital conflicts (e.g. Chinitz and Brown, 2002; Arrindell and Luteijn, 2000). 
Thus, empirical evidence points to the importance of including preference based 
matching in an extension of Becker’s model  
 
However, in addition to including the aspect of preference based matching, we 
make the novel claim that the matching on preferences for partner specialization 
occurs as a result of subconscious coordination mechanisms. We hereby uphold 
the assumption in Becker’s model of utility maximization, but depart from the 
economic paradigm concerning the conscious rational actor. Using agent based 
modeling we demonstrate how this extension of the model produces predictions 
which fit closely to the observed trends in divorce rates and allows for divorce to 
be caused by preference mismatch. Thus this paper contributes to the literature 
by emphasizing the importance of preference based matching, and by 
demonstrating the potential of departing from a classical economic assumption, 
which has dominated extensions of Becker’s model so far.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we develop a version of Becker’s classical 
model of marriage matching on productivity traits and show this model’s 
predictions of the development in marriage and divorce rates, using a simulation 
model. Second, we introduce matching on preferences on partner specialization 
into this model, and show that while this model can generate preference based 
mismatch its predictions of divorce rates do not change qualitatively. Finally, we 
introduce a subconscious coordination mechanism of these preferences which 
produces predictions which are more in line with the observed trends in divorce 




2. Becker’s marriage market 
As mentioned, Becker’s model of marriage and divorce includes partner 
matching on both productivity traits and on preferences on partner specialization. 
However, as the model is mainly known for its focus on partners’ matching on 
productivity traits, this first section develops a Becker model, which only 
includes matching on productivity traits, to show the implications of this popular 
version of the model.  
 
Becker’s principles of matching 
Becker’s initial assertion is that men and women are utility maximizers and that 
marriage is part of a utility-maximizing strategy. Gains from marriage arise from 
complementarity in the production of various household goods, because 
marriage facilitates division of labor and specialization. The outcome from men 
and women’s joint efforts in household production exceeds the outcome if a 
single person’s household displayed the same effort (children is an example of 
complementarity). However, to get the most of this ‘exchange-based’ 
community, the two partners must accept this division of labor and the resulting 
specialization. Since women give birth, and the pregnancy and subsequent 
nursing of the child is more compatible with housekeeping than a labor-market 
career, she is left with domestic specialization and he with labor-market 
specialization. This then explains the existence of sex-specific specialization. 
 
Taking outset in Becker (1991) we formally express these aspects of marriage as 
the income plus the income equivalent of utility from consuming household 
production within a marriage:  
 
(( ) ,( ) ) mm ww w w m m UWt wt H Tt Tt ββ αα =+ + − −   (1) 
 
wherew is the general wage rate for married women and  w β  and  w t  the work 
productivity and time spent working per calendar period by the specific woman FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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in question and so  ww wt β  is the income earned by the woman. In the same way 
mm Wt β  is income earned by the man. Since income is spent on consumption 
goods and utility is expressed in its income equivalent, these elements enter 
additively.  (.) H  is the utility derived from household production which requires 
spending time on household chores
2. T is the total amount of time available for 
the woman so that  w Tt −  is the amount of time spent by the woman on 
household chores (correspondingly for the man). Note that time spent working is 
bounded below by zero and above by what corresponds to full time employment 
(tT < ).  w α  is the woman’s productivity in household chores so that () ww Ttα −  
is the effective input to household production delivered by the woman 
(correspondingly for the man). Specialization gains result if e.g. the woman is 
more productive at household chores ( w α > m α ) and/or less productive on the 
labor market (w<W ). In this case the married couple can specialize in the 
production where each has a comparative advantage and this increases the 
combined outcome compared to production in single households. Note that the 
two partners differ only in their productivity traits – not in their basic preferences 
for how to allocate time in the family. Thus within a given marriage the partners 
identify the optimal allocation of their time and implement this – because it is in 
their mutual interest to do so. 
 
For simplicity we assume that the man holds full-time employment ( m tt = ) and 
so only the woman’s labor market-participation is a decision variable for married 
                                                 
2  (.) H  is characterized by falling marginal productivity of time input. Note that  (.) H  may reflect 
complementarity in production of e.g. children (where 
''
12(( ) ,( ) ) 0 ww mm HT t T t αα −− >   
allowing 
(( ) ,( ) ) ww mm HT t T t αα −− >  (( ) ,0) ww HT tα − + (0,( ) ) mm HT t α − ) for small investments 
of time while still implying substantial substitution possibilities between partners’ time investment in 
connection with household chores (and e.g.  
''
12(( ) ,( ) ) 0 ww mm HT t T t αα −− < ) for higher levels 
of time investment.  FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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couples. The woman’s utility maximizing participation level 
*
w t  is given by the 
first order condition:  1(( ) , ) ww w m w wH T t β ααα =−  implying that utility 
maximizing participation for a given couple is a function of both productivity 
traits and the woman’s wage rate, i.e. 
*(, , ) ww w m tw β αα  and so is the couple’s 
resulting utility level, i.e.  
** (, , ) wwm UU w β αα =      (2)   
Clearly optimal participation is bounded below and so if 
* 0 w t =  optimal 
participation becomes independent of the , ww wβ α and m α traits. Inserting this into 
(1) we see that the corresponding utility level 
*
0 (( ) ,( ) ) mw m UWt H T T t β αα =+ − 
becomes independent of  w wβ , i.e.  
 
**
00 (,) wm UU αα =      ( 3 )  
 
The Marriage Market. 
Becker assumes that partner search resembles a market (the marriage market) 
where men and women search for partners with traits that maximize their utility. 
Here, a person evaluates a potential partner’s traits and the utility outcome of a 
possible marriage according to the relevant utility equation ((2) or (3) depending 
on the current wage level). This results in a utility offer (a share of the total 
utility that marriage would generate) which the potential partner evaluates and 
decides to accept or reject. This is done in competition with other men and 
women and the resulting matches gravitate toward the set of matches that 
maximizes the total utility of participating couples (for details, see Becker, 
1991). If the current allocation of partners does not maximize utility, then 
partners are likely to reorganize
3. Hence only the set of matches that maximizes 
                                                 
3 Consider two men with trait values 1 and 10, respectively, and two women also with trait values 1 
and 10. If a couple’s resulting utility is found by multiplying trait values then clearly matching the 
high valued partners will maximize total utility (10*10+1*1 as opposed to 10*1+10*1 with mixed 
matching). Now if mixed marriages occur and the two partners with high trait values meet the man FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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the total utility of all couples is stable, and a set of matches that does not 
maximize utility will tend to break down due to better offers in the market. If 
there are no search costs (i.e. the market is efficient and transparent) men and 
women know their own ‘value’ at the market and their gains from relationships 
with different types of partners. Here, only marriage offers, which are part of the 
set of utility maximizing set of matches are given and accepted and the marriage 
market quickly settles down at this equilibrium. 
 
The key result emitting from Becker’s work (Becker 1991; see also Becker et al. 
1977) is that the interaction of partners’ traits in household production 
determines the utility maximizing sorting of partners. We can determine this 







>    for all trait values in the market   (4) 
 
the positive assortative sorting of the men’s  m α  trait and the women’s aggregate 
w α  trait maximizes total welfare (as in the example above). When an increase in 
the man’s trait increases the utility effect of increasing the woman’s trait then 
pairing high trait values generates a ‘double dividend’. Thus, if there are no 
search costs, and utility at the time of marriage is defined by (3) and (4), the 
marriage market equilibrium is the positive assortative trait sorting of partners 
that we denote: 
 
(,) wm S αα         ( 5 )  
 
                                                                                                                                          
can make the woman a better utility offer than she is getting in her current marriage that only 
generates 10 utility points to be shared with her current partner (while still leaving him with a gain) 
since the now marriage will generate 100 utility points. FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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where  w α  and  m α  are vectors of the men’s and women’s trait values in the 
marriage market. 
 
Changing Social Conditions and Divorce. 
According to Becker, optimal sorting changes under changing social conditions. 
Relationships formed in a social situation where women only specialize as 
housewives (resulting in the partner sorting (5)) might find that it is 
advantageous for women to work as social conditions change (e.g. because wage 
rates have risen). Then partners decide labor-market participation according to 
(2). Assuming that women’s productivity traits ( and  ww wβ α ) are separable from 
men’s productivity traits in the resulting utility function (i.e. 









>      ( 6 )  
 
we have that positive assortative sorting in the men’s  m α  trait and the women’s 
aggregate  w u  productivity trait will maximize total utility. A new equilibrium 
partner sorting then characterizes the marriage market: 
 
(, ) wm Su α         ( 7 )  
 
where  w u  and  m α  are vectors of men and women’s trait values in the marriage 
market. 
 
Generally, there will be a discrepancy between the partner sorting which is 
optimal at the time of marriage (5) and the partner sorting which is optimal after 
the social change (7). Though the women’s personal traits ( , ww β α ) have not 
changed, the changing social conditions change the relative value of these traits. FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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This affects women’s value at the marriage market and may lead to mismatch 
and divorce (e.g. wives with high ‘values’ at the time of marriage due to high 
housework productivity might have poor breadwinning skills and hence low 
‘value’ in the new social situation). This rise in the divorce rate is a consequence 
of the changing social conditions (risingw) and is correlated with the rising level 
of married women’s labor-market participation. However, with a stabilization of 
the social conditions, the systematic mismatch caused by unforeseen 
development in the general wage level of married women will disappear along 
with the rise in the divorce rate, because the rise in the divorce rate brought 
about by changing social conditions in this way is transitory in nature. Thus, 
when the equilibrium sorting that applies as family life unfolds corresponds to 
the one that applies at marriage, no mismatch will develop because partners 
ascertain each others traits perfectly at the time of marriage.   
 
However, evaluation of traits is difficult and costly, which means that perfect 
sorting is often not the result. Because of search costs and uncertainty some men 
and women may choose to remain single (because expected gains are smaller 
than expected costs of searching for a partner). Further, the resulting set of 
marriages may deviate from (4) because of uncertain ascertainment of traits at 
marriage. Thus, even without changing social conditions, a person might be 
disappointed with the traits of his or her partner after marriage, and if this 
disappointment is great enough divorce and subsequent search for a new partner 
might be advantageous.  
 
Hence, uncertain trait estimates may generate a positive rate of divorce under 
stable social conditions. But more importantly, a change in social conditions 
affecting the optimal sorting may also cause the trait estimation uncertainty at 
marriage to change if the estimation uncertainty associated with the aggregate 
productivity trait  w u  differs from that associated with  w α . This may cause a 
permanent change in divorce rates if the change in estimation uncertainty at 




Hereby Becker’s marriage market model implies two important mechanisms 
through which a rise in women’s labor-market participation may affect divorce: 
1) a transitory effect on the generation experiencing the social change and so 
experiencing a change in the equilibrium sorting between the time of marriages 
and the time family life unfolds, and 2) a permanent effect which results if 
estimation uncertainty associated with the traits that are relevant after the social 
change is different from the estimation uncertainty associated with the traits that 
are relevant before the rise in women’s participation rates changes. 
 
Divorce in Becker’s model is then the result of partners realising that they can 
get a better deal with another partner e.g. because the current partners 
productivity traits or preferences were misjudged at marriage or because social 
conditions change causing the value of the current partner’s traits to change. To 
understand the resulting correlation pattern between participation and divorce we 
formally introduce uncertainty and search costs into our marriage market model. 
Because it is intractable to introduce uncertainty into the analytical model above, 
we assume a specific functional form for  (.) H  in (1). This allows us to program 
a simulation model of the marriage market, which includes uncertainty and 
search cost. This simulation model allows us to assess the exact predictions of 
Becker’s model. 
 
3. A Simulation Model with uncertainty and search costs 
We base our simulation model on the assumption that the household production 
function has the specific form  (.) ( ) ( ) ww mm H Tt Tt K αα =− + − + (see appendix 
for details). K is a positive gain from marriage and reflects basic 
complementarities in household production. The variable elements reflect input 
substitution possibilities at the margin. This specific form satisfies the general 
conditions laid out above and implies that market equilibrium (when there is no 
estimation error) is a consequence of positive assortative sorting of partner traits 




The simulation model allocates traits (home and labor-market productivities) 
drawn from uniform distributions to the market participants. Then we simulate 
the initial marriage market by randomly matching one couple at a time. When 
the first couple is matched they evaluate their potential partner’s traits, with 
error. We assume that each market participant knows current wage rates and the 
distribution of traits in the market. Thus, the market participants correctly 
calculate the expected utility gain from continued search versus marriage in the 
evaluation of a potential partner. If positive net-utility is possible for both 
partners they marry, otherwise they continue to search and return to the pool of 
singles. Then the next couple is matched and so on. When no more marriages 
occur we move to the family life stage. Here two things happen: 1) partners learn 
the true trait values of their partners and 2) women’s wage rate may change. 
Since traits were estimated with error, mistakes are made just as changed wage 
rate may cause the realized distribution of couples to deviate from the utility 
maximizing distribution. Once again partners correctly calculate the expected 
gain from continued partner search in the marriage market and if this is greater 
than his/her search costs it results in a divorce. 
 
With no estimation errors and no search costs the model settles down at the 
positive assertive sorting solution (as defined in (5)). In this second round all 
participants marry and there are no divorces if the women’s wage rate is held 
constant. But if we allow the women’s wage rate to increase between the initial 
marriage stage and the second family life stage the model emits the new 
equilibrium trait sorting (7). If the women’s trait rankings according to  w α  and 
w u  differ so will the equilibrium sortings (5) and (7) and the result will be a 
divorce. The resulting divorce rate from a given wage increase depends on the 
correlation between the women’s  w α  and  w u  traits. With perfect correlation 
there is no mismatch and no divorces. Thus, the model replicates the analytical 
model developed above when search costs and trait estimation error are zero.  
 FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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If we introduce trait estimation error and search costs, the market settles down at 
something close to but not perfect positive assortative sorting in the first stage. 
Some participants do not marry and others make mistakes when evaluating traits, 
and this causes ‘mismatches’. In the second round some of these mismatches end 
in divorce even when the wage rate does not change because of an expected net 
gain from renewed partner search. The size of these effects depends on the size 
of the assumed estimation error and search costs. 
 
We use this simulation model to investigate how an increase in the women’s 
wage rate affects divorce rates. The increase spans from a situation where no 
women participate in the labor market to a situation where all women participate 
at an average rate of about 60% of men’s full-time participation rate. We do this 
under different assumptions about correlation of women’s  w α  and  w u  traits and 
under different assumptions about the difference in trait estimation error 
associated with  w α  and  w u . We also simulate divorce rates under stable social 
conditions with both a low and a high woman’s wage rate replicating the stable 
situation before and after the wage increase.  
 










w α and  w u  
traits
1 
Before wage increase  Just after wage increase 
 































Large   None  0.00  0.10  0.17  0.57 0.17 0.31 0.60 0.17 0.01 
Some None  0.00  0.11  0.19  0.57 0.16 0.57 0.60 0.16 0.00 
Some Some  0.00  0.11  0.19  0.57 0.16 0.59 0.60 0.16 0.05 
Some  Large    0.00 0.11 0.19 0.57 0.14 0.56 0.60 0.14 0.30 
1)  If there is a difference, uncertainty about the  w u trait is larger. 
2)  Average married women’s labor-market participation as a fraction of men’s. 
3)  Fraction of men and women who are single. 
4)  Fraction of married couples who divorce. 
 FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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The table illustrates the general points made above in a specific simulation run of 
the model using 90 men and 90 women. The first column shows the correlation 
between the women’s  w α  and  w u traits. The next column shows the difference in 
estimation error at marriage between the two traits  w α  and  w u .  
 
The ’Before wage increase’ columns show how marriage and divorce unfold 
under a low woman’s wage ensuring that no woman chooses to work. The first 
column shows the average labor-market participation rate of married women 
after marriage, the second column shows the fraction of single men and women 
after the initial marriage market equilibrium and the third column shows the 
fraction of married couples who choose to divorce after observing traits. The 
numbers replicate the stable situation before the wage increase, and trait 
estimation errors at marriage are the only cause of the resulting divorce rate.  
 
The ‘Just after wage increase’ columns show how marriage and divorce unfolds 
following a wage increase. Here partners marry under a low woman’s wage, and 
divorce unfolds after a wage increase which induces all women to work part time 
as indicated in the participation rate column (the indicated rate is the average 
participation rate – all women work, but the labor supply varies between women 
since men and women’s traits vary). Thus, in addition to divorces caused by trait 
estimation errors at marriage, this also captures the transitory increases in 
divorce caused by changing societal conditions between the time of marriage and 
divorce.  
 
The ‘Long after wage increase’ columns show how marriage and divorce unfold 
under a high woman’s wage ensuring that all women work. This reflects the 
permanent divorce rate under the new social conditions (after the disappearance 
of the transitory effect on divorce rates), and captures the effect of a change in 
trait estimation error if estimation error associated with  w α  differs from that 




We present four simulations which illustrate different combinations of 
assumptions about  w α   w u trait correlations and estimation errors. As expected, 
rising labor-market participation reduces gains from marriage relative to 
remaining single (as it reduces specialization gains of marriage), and causes a 
positive correlation between the rate of single households and women’s wages. 
In the first simulation where women’s traits are highly correlated, partners who 
wish to be single are the main cause of temporary rise in divorce rates. In the 
other three simulations the shift in optimal trait-sorting causes the temporary rise 
in divorce rates to be even higher as some partners now also divorce because of 
the unforeseen trait shift and seek a better matched partner.  
 
The last three simulations illustrate how much larger trait estimation errors of  w u  
have to be compared to  w α  to get a permanent, positive effect on the divorce 
rates. As shown we need a large increase in the new traits estimation error to 
generate a permanent divorce rate increase (i.e. with errors of the same 
magnitude the permanent divorce rate falls). This is because a reduction in gains 
from marriage also reduces the negative utility effects of trait estimation errors 
and since search costs do not change, a general reduction of search effort in the 
market is optimal. For some participants this implies remaining single, and for 
partners that remain in the marriage market this implies accepting partners with 
greater trait mismatch (because the utility effect of this mismatch is smaller than 
before).  
 
There is always a positive temporary effect caused by partners divorcing to 
remarry. Since the shift in optimal sorting produces this temporary effect, the 
effect will be present unless there is a perfect correlation between the pre- and 
postparticipation rise sortings. The assumptions, which ensure a close correlation 
of  w α  and  (, ) ww w uw β α for the relevant range of w values, are clearly restrictive 
and unlikely to apply. Further, if such assumptions would apply then logically FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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the errors made when partners estimate  ( , ) ww w uw β α would not exceed those 
made when estimating  w α  since  w α  in this case would be a perfect proxy for the 
(, ) ww w uw β α  trait.  
 
In conclusion, Becker’s productivity trait model can produce scenarios with a 
permanent increase in divorce rates if men’s uncertainty about women’s labor 
market productivity trait is larger than their uncertainty about women’s  
household productivity trait. However, this model will then always produce an 
additional temporary increase in divorce for remarriage during the period where 
women’s labor market participation rates are rising because this rise causes 
relative trait values to change after marriage. This temporary rise in divorce rates 
disappears again when labor market participation rates stabilize and relative trait 
values no longer change after marriage. Thus when Becker’s model (as specified 
above) predicts a permanent rise in divorce rates it always also predicts a 
temporary rise implying that divorce rates fall again (to some extent) when 
women’s labor market participation rates stabilize. It is this fall that we have not 
yet seen in a number of countries even though women’s labor market 
participation rates have stabilized (see figures 2 and 3) 
 
4. Previous studies of causes of marital instability 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the predictions made using Becker’s 
basic model of selection on productivity traits do not comply with the observed 
long run trends in marriage and divorce rates. And while a number of empirical 
studies support the model’s claim that divorce results from disappointment with 
the current partner’s productivity traits (see for instance Bruderl and Kalter 
2001; Goldscheider and Waite 1986; Heidemann, Sihomlinova and Rand 1998; 
Heckert, Nowak and Snyder 1998; Mueller and Campbell 1977; Preston and 
Richards 1975; Ressler and Waters 2000; Svarer 2002; Wolf and MacDonald 
1979; Voydanoff 1990; Weiss and Willis 1997), other empirical studies question 
the focus on the production based traits. For instance Huber and Spitze (1980) FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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find that absolute earnings of married men and women do not affect 
considerations of divorce, and South and Lloyd (1995) find no effect of female 
labor-market participation on marital instability (for similar results, see Ekert-
Jaffe and Solaz 2001; Lichter et al. 1992; Hoffman and Duncan 1995; 
Oppenheimer 1997a, 1997b; Ottesen 2000: 99ff). Moreover, Sayer and Bianchi 
(2000) find that productivity traits are not very important indicators of marital 
instability (which is also the conclusion of Rogers and DeBoer 2001). Thus, 
matching on productivity based traits does not fully explain marriage and 
divorce dynamics. 
 
However, the empirical evidence of Becker’s claim that also preference based 
matching matters for marital conflicts seems more unanimous (e.g. Chinitz and 
Brown, 2002; Arrindell and Luteijn, 2000). And within this literature, some 
studies find interesting evidence of an interaction between preferences and the 
division of labor in the household. Here, Spitze and South (1985) show how the 
destabilizing effect of a woman’s labor-market participation only occurs when 
her husband disapproves of his wife’s wage labor. Moreover, Sayer and Bianchi 
(2000) show how the significant and negative effect of wife’s income on marital 
stability disappears when controlling for both wife’s and husband’s gender 
ideology (see also Perry-Jenkins and Folk, 1994; Blair and Johnson, 1992; 
Greenstein, 1995; Kalmijn, de Graff and Portman, 2004). These findings 
demonstrate that matching on preferences is not important vis-a-vis matching on 
productivity based traits rather they are important because they determine what 
is the proper matching of the partners’ productivity traits. Because of this 
compelling evidence of the importance of preference based matching, we 
introduce selection on preferences into Becker’s basic model in the next section 
(as suggested by Becker himself and others).  
 
However, it is our claim that a simple extension of the basic economic model (of 
conscious rational selection on traits) ignores important aspects of matching on 
preferences that have been suggested by more elaborated theories on the issue. In FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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addition, just using the full version of Becker’s model, which includes both 
matching on productivity traits and on preferences, does not produce predictions 
in line with the observed divorce rates. Next, we therefore present and discuss 
additional theories on preference based mating, to consider whether and how 
they add to our understanding of this type of matching. 
 
5. Alternative theories on preference based matching  
The studies mentioned above which analyze the implications of preference based 
matching often only make implicit references to theoretical frameworks (e.g. 
Kalmijn, Loeve & Manting, 2007). However, we do find theories of the 
relationship between preferences over womens’ labor market participation ( w t ) 
and marriage and divorce patterns, that facilitate useful extensions of Becker’s 
model.  
 
One early example of a theory which considers the interaction between partner’s 
productivity and preference based traits is Rodman’s classical “theory of 
resources in cultural context” (Rodman, 1967; 1971). According to this theory 
the relationship between married men’s resources and their authority in marriage 
varies between countries, because family norms – or partners’ preferences on 
specialization - vary between countries. Thus while the man’s authority increases 
by his educational attainment in one country, there is no correlation between the 
two aspects in other countries. This then suggests that the norms which guide a 
marriage determine the influence of the resources of the spouses and of changes 
in these resources. The theory concerns differences between countries. However 
we may also use it to suggest that family norms or preferences differ between 
individuals and that these differences affect their expectations towards a 
potential spouse, and hence the degree to which the acquisition or lack of a 
certain resource is reason for divorce. This then also implies that compatibility 
between partner’s preferences will ease negotiations on which resources to 
acquire and accumulate, and thus reduce conflicts and the probability of divorce.  
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In his 1994-article from American Journal of Sociology, Matthijs Kalmijn 
presents and tests a somewhat similar theory. It is his claim that individuals 
prefer the company of likeminded, as being with likeminded people provides a 
common basis of conversation and reduces friction within marriage which may 
arise as a result of dissimilarities in taste (see also Oppenheimer, 1994). Thus, 
also Kalmijn’s proposition strongly supports the idea of preference based 
matching. However, none of these theories provide us with a theoretical model 
which will yield qualitatively different predictions than Becker’s models; both 
theories claim that partners match on preferences and that the preferences are 
important for the individuals’ appreciation of their partner’s productivity traits. 
 
But in contrast, in the theory on the habitus formulated by the French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu, the idea about preference based matching appears with a slight 
twist. Bourdieu agrees that we prefer the company of likeminded, but in 
addition, he suggests an alternative coordination mechanism for marriage. He 
claims that even though people are able to make rational decisions, most 
decisions take place at a subconscious level. As a consequence, partners tend to 
sort according to preferences over   w t   without observing this trait consciously or 
rationally considering its implications. Consequently, individuals feel 
subconsciously attracted to partners with corresponding preferences over  w t  
even in situations where this trait is not critical for expectations regarding family 
life (Bourdieu 1984:174). While this process is subconscious and not dependent 
on rational utility maximizing behavior, it is nevertheless consistent with it, and 
the resulting selection looks as though it could have been the result of a 
conscious rational decision-making process. However, the important difference 
between the two processes is that conscious selection with respect to a trait only 
takes place when partners expect this trait to be important for family life after 
marriage. In contrast, because the subconscious selection process is not based on 
rational calculus, it is always present, and so ensures selection on traits that are 
important for marital outcome under the current social conditions as well as 




Bourdieu is not the only scholar who promotes the idea about subconscious 
decision making – in sociology we find it in Giddens’ structuration theory 
(1984.) just as Milton Friedman introduces the concept into the discipline of 
economics (1953). And while the power of subconscious decision making is also 
evident from a number of empirical studies (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004; Burke and Miller, 1999; Kleinmuntz, 1990), Bourdieu’s 
theory is among the few that suggests a link between this type of decision 
making to marital behavior. From the studies on subconscious decision making, 
we furthermore learn that compared to decision making based on rational 
calculus, subconscious decision making is less efficient and precise (for a 
review, see Kleinmuntz, 1990).  
 
In the following section we show, first, what predictions regarding marriage and 
divorce rates Becker’s model produces when it also includes preference based 
matching, and second, the predictions made by the model when we introduce a 
subconscious coordination mechanism.  
 
6. Introducing matching on preferences  
We first introduce preference over  w t into the basic model without search costs 
developed in section 2 in a simple way by redefining household utility as: 
 
     ˆ() () ()( 1 ) () ww m w w w Ut Ut u t u t ππ =+ + −  
 
where  (.) U  is household income including the income equivalent of household 
production as defined in (1).  () mw utis the man’s utility derived from his preferences 
over the woman’s labor market participation and  () ww utis the woman’s FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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corresponding utility. π  is the relative weight of the man’s utility in the households 
aggregate utility
4 and we assume the following functional form:   
    
    
() ( ) ()
() ( ) ()
mw w m w
ww w w w
ut U t U t







where the σ -parameters capture the partners’ preferences over the woman’s 
participation. If  0 m σ = , the man has no preference for or against women’s 
participation (i.e.  () 0 mw ut = ). But  if  0 m σ < , the man systematically prefers a 
lower participation rate than the one that maximizes household income  (i.e. if 
*
w t   
maximizes household income the man perceives  
*
wm t σ −  as the optimal 
participation rate). Clearly, partners with the same σ  trait values agree on the 
utility evaluation of different family situations and they can generate higher benefits 
of marriage than partners who disagree and perceive different  w t values as optimal
5. 
 
For a couple that aggress on participation preferences ( wm σσ σ ==) we have the 
following simple relationship:    
                                                 
4 Note that 01 π << and that this weight is not a structural parameter but dependant on the 
resulting marriage market equilibrium essentially reflecting the relative value of the partner’s 
alternative possibilities on the market.   
5 Formally, irrespective of the family income distributionπ  and agreed participation adjustment σ  
we have that   
 




w t  maximizes 
* () w Ut σ + . To see this note that the definition (6) implies that  
* () ( )      ww w w Ut Ut t σσ +≥ + ∀  with equality applying only for the  w t  that maximizes 
()   ww Ut σ + Thus only when  mw σσ =  will this  w t  also maximize  ()   wm Ut σ + whereby (i) is 
satisfied with equality. Otherwise (i.e. for mw σσ ≠  ), only one of the two right-hand side elements 




ˆ() ( )( 1 )( ) ww m w w Ut Ut Ut πσ π σ =+ − − +      (8) 
 
Thus, in a social situation where Becker’s basic productivity trait model indicates 
that 
*
w t  is the optimal participation level, a couple that agrees on preferences  
maximizes utility by choosing a participation level of 
**
ww tt
σ σ =−  (on the other 
hand a couple that disagrees can never achieve this level of utility).  
 
Now let us reconsider Becker’s marriage market for this model. Retracing the 
derivations in the previous section, the utility maximizing woman’s labor-market 
participation for a given couple is a function of productivity traits and the woman’s 
wage rate. However, with our extension, it is now also dependent on the σ  
parameters, i.e. 
** (,,,,) ww w w m w m tt w
σ αασσ = , whereby the corresponding utility level 
depends on all five parameters, i.e.  
** ˆˆ (, , , , ) wwmwm UU w β αασσ =      (9)   
 
Again optimal participation is bounded below and so if 
* 0 w t =  optimal participation 
becomes independent of the w wβ and  , wm σσ traits, and so the corresponding utility 
level becomes independent of  w wβ  and  , wm σσ, i.e.  
 
**
00 ˆˆ (,) wm UU αα =      (10) 
 
Rational conscious preference trait selection  
Focusing on the effect of rising women’s wage rates on the optimal sorting, we 
consider families started in a social situation corresponding to (10). As in section 2 
rational productivity coordination ensures sorting along productivity traits 
according to (5). Since  , wm σσ are irrelevant for marital outcome in this social 
situation, these traits are not part of the rational and conscious partner selection. 
When women’s wage rates rise and optimal participation levels become positive, a FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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mismatch occurs if the new optimal productivity sorting (according to (7)) does not 
correspond to the original sorting according to (5), just as in the original model. In 
addition since original mating was not coordinated over  , wm σσ these will also 
mismatch in the new situation where preferences over participation become relevant 
for marital outcome. When social conditions have stabilized again, conscious 
partner selection will ensure coordination over both traits and this prevents further 
mismatch and subsequent divorce. Thus without uncertainty or search costs, a 
transitional rise in the divorce rate driven by mismatch of both productivity and 
preference traits will arise.  
 
Subconscious preference trait selection 
With the alternative subconscious coordination mechanism, partners sort according 
to preferences over  w t  without observing this trait consciously or rationally 
considering its implications. Rather, individuals feel subconsciously attracted to 
partners with the same preferences and tend to find partners with similar σ  values 
– even in situations where this trait is not important for expectations regarding 
family life. When we embed the subconscious coordination mechanism into our 
model, the resulting matching corresponds to the matching produced through 
rational utility maximizing behavior in the marriage market.  Thus subconscious 
mechanism ensures coordination of the σ  trait (ideally  mw σσ = ) even when this 
particular trait does not affect the resulting utility of marriage in the current social 
situation. 
 
Again consider families started in a social situation corresponding to (10). 
Subconscious coordination ensures coordination over σ  and as in the previous 
section, rational productivity coordination ensures sorting along productivity traits 
according to (5). Further differentiating (8), the same assortative sorting of partners 
according to productivity traits as in Becker’s original model ((5) and (7)) applies, 




6  When women’s wage rates rise and optimal participation levels become 
positive, mismatch may develop if the new optimal productivity sorting (according 
to (7)) does not correspond to the original sorting according to (5) just as above. 
However, the original preference coordination ( mw σσ = ) is still optimal. This 
situation causes a transitional rise in the divorce rate, but it is only driven by 
productivity mismatch. Because the subconscious preference coordination is 
independent of conscious rational choice, partners coordinate on this trait dimension 
in both situations and it does not contribute to the transitional rise in the divorce 
rate.  
  
At a first glance, it is difficult to see how this extension addresses the two empirical 
issues in focus: the cause of divorce and the ‘missing’ transitional rise. However, 
this becomes clear when we introduce coordination error and search costs. Then the 
combination of participation preferences and the subconscious coordination 
mechanism may shift the cause of divorce toward preferences and eliminate the 
transitional rise in divorce rates. This then produces predictions that correspond 
more with the actual development in both divorce causes and divorce rates. 
 
7. Participation Preferences with Uncertainty and Search Costs 
We adjust our simulation model from section 3 by endowing partners with a 
preferred participation adjustment parameter corresponding to (8). This reduces the 
resulting income equivalent of the utility of marriage if partner parameters diverge 
and reflects the compromise over the woman’s participation rate that mismatched 
couples must make (resulting in a chosen participation rate somewhere between the 
                                                 
6 Formally letting 
*
w t denote optimal participation in the Becker model and inserting 
*
w t σ −  for the 
optimal participation level in (6) and differentiating  ˆ(.) U we have:    
 





=      ( i )  
for traits ε and η , and so for any given σ  an optimal sorting applying to   (.) U also applies to 
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two partners’ differing preferred values - see the appendix for details). To simplify 
we assume that there are two possible values of this parameter and so the partners 
either agree or disagree on optimal participation.   
  We repeate the simulation of partner search, marriage and divorce from 
section 3. We normalize men’s participation preference trait to zero ( 0 σ = ). They 
select partners among women of which some proportion is endowed with the non-
zero parameter value (all other parameters except for those specified in the tables 
below remain unchanged). The simulation presented in table 2 assumes rational 
conscious coordination. In the ‘before’ situation we do not expect participation 
preferences to affect the outcome of marriage and partners do not coordinate on this 
trait. Without coordination we assume the probability of mismatch is 0.6. Conscious 
coordination at marriage occurs when the trait affects realized marriage outcomes in 
the social conditions applying at the time of marriage. The resulting mismatch is 
then a result of partners’ imperfect evaluation of a trait. In the ‘just after’ and ‘long 
after’ situations, preferences are important for marital outcome, which means that 
partners evaluate then and coordinate according to then. Here we assume that the 
probability of mismatch is reduced to 0.4. We assume that each market participant 
knows the probability of σ  trait mismatch in addition to the distribution of other 
traits and current wage rates
7. This implies that participants can correctly calculate 
the expected utility gain from continued search when he or she meets and evaluates 
a potential partner. In the family life stage partners learn the true σ  trait of their 
partner if it actively affects labor supply decisions and once again partners correctly 
calculate the expected gain from continued partner search in the marriage market. If 
this is greater than his/her search costs the marriage dissolves.  
 
Table 2. Dynamics of Divorce Simulated for Becker’s Marriage Market Model, with consciously coordinated 
productivity trait and consciously coordinated preference trait 
                                                 
7 Partners do not look for a potential partner σ  trait specifically rather, it is an integrated part of 
subconsciously evaluating the general preference compatibility. However, partners do realize that 
there is a risk of mismatch and divorce due to other traits than those consciously evaluated and take 
this unspecified risk into account when deciding to marry or divorce just like they take into account 
that consciously evaluated traits are estimated with error.  FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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Imporance  of 





Before wage increase  Just after wage increase 
 































None .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.57 .16 .59 
(0.00) 
.60 .16 .05 
(0.00) 
Small .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.58 .16 .67 
(0.78) 
.61 .16 .29 
(1.63) 
Some .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.60 .16 .65 
(1.15) 
.62 .16 .32 
(1.66) 
Large   .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.65 .16 .59 
(1.44) 
.65 .16 .32 
(1.67) 
We assume ‘some’ correlation between women’s  w α and  w u  traits and that there is ‘some’ difference in 
uncertainty about the traits (i.e. uncertainty about the  w u  trait is somewhat larger). 
1)  Married women’s average labor-market participation as a fraction of men’s. 
2)  Fraction of men and women who are single. 
3)  Fraction of married couples who divorce. 
 
In table 2 (same headings etc. as table 1) we present simulation results for different 
utility weights of σ  trait mismatch (a zero utility weight of mismatch corresponds 
to Becker’s model from the previous section). When we introduce preference based 
coordination error the permanent divorce rates increase, and this effect increases 
with its importance as its utility weight increases when we move down the table.  
 
We have added an indicator of the importance of diverging preferences on 
specialization for utility loss of couples that divorce. The number in parenthesis 
after the divorce rate is the utility gain from harmonizing participation preferences 
relative to the expected gain from divorce averaged over couples that divorce. We 
see that inharmonious participation preferences is a quantitatively important effect 
that dominates (a ratio greater than 1) the gain from divorce in the lower parts of the 
table where the relative weight of participation preferences is large. Thus when we 
introduce preferences over participation into the model we find that preference 
disagreement is an important cause of divorce. However, reflecting the dynamics of FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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the model without estimation error above, we still have a substantial transitory 
increase in divorce rates. This is not surprising, since all we do in the augmented 
model is to increase the number of uncoordinated traits before transition from one 
to two. While the importance of the new trait in generating divorce obviously 
increases as this traits’ utility weight increases, the dynamics of the model is not 
affected qualitatively since its coordination is based on the same conscious 
mechanism.  
  We now rerun the simulations for the same set of men and women but now 
with the subconscious coordination mechanism. We assume that the subconscious 
coordination mechanism is prone to error, just as the trait estimation error affecting 
productivity coordination. This is not estimation error as such (since traits are not 
estimated consciously), but the unconscious coordination process is unlikely to be 
perfect and will cause some level of mismatch (i.e., deviation between  m σ  and  w σ ). 
This error and resulting mismatch along the σ  dimension apply both when 
women’s participation rates are zero and when they are positive since the 
coordination process is independent of the participation rate. For comparability we 
assume the probability of mismatch is 0.4 like for the conscious mechanism above.   
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Table 3. . Dynamics of Divorce Simulated for Becker’s Marriage Market Model, with consciously coordinated 
productivity trait and subconsciously coordinated preference trait 
Imporance  of 





Before wage increase  Just after wage increase 
 































None .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.57 .16 .59 
(0.00) 
.60 .16 .05 
(0.00) 
Small .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.57 .16 .53 
(0.45) 
.61 .16 .29 
(1.63) 
Some .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.58 .16 .45 
(0.85) 
.62 .16 .32 
(1.66) 
Large   .00  .11  .19 
(0.00) 
.61 .16 .36 
(1.22) 
.65 .16 .32 
(1.67) 
We assume ‘some’ correlation between women’s  w α and  w u  traits and that there is ‘some’ difference in 
uncertainty about the traits (i.e. uncertainty about the  w u  trait is somewhat larger). 
1)  Married women’s average labor-market participation as a fraction of men’s. 
4)  Fraction of men and women who are single. 
5)  Fraction of married couples who divorce. 
  
Table 3 has the same headings and utility weights etc. as table 2. The only 
difference is that the σ  trait is now coordinated at marriage also in the ‘before’ 
situation because of the subconscious mechanism where this was not the case in 
table 2. The coordination mechanism in the “just after” and “long after” situations is 
exactly the same as in table 2. But in contrast to previous simulations, the 
preference traits are now coordinated in the “before” situation. However the 
“before” result remains the same. This is because preference trait has no influence 
on marital utility in this situation where no women work. Also the result in the 
‘long after’ situation is exactly the same: Although this trait matters for the utility of 
marriage, both the suggested mechanism imply a coordination of this trait when 
women work. However, results for the just after situation differ crucially. As in 
table 2, increasing the utility weight of preferences over participation as we move 
down the table does not increase the temporary divorce effect which, in the first 
line, is entirely due to productivity mismatch. However, as the importance of FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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preference trait increases, it crowds out the temporary effect of rising wages and 
subsequent productivity trait mismatch on both divorce and remarriage. As in table 
2, we see that inharmonious preferences are important (a ratio greater than 1) as this 
situation contributes significantly to the gain from divorce in the lower part of the 
table. Thus, the value of having a good σ  trait match dominates the divorce 
decision and matched σ  traits in the ‘just after’ situation stabilizes couples even in 
case of poor matches on productivity traits. This is because the utility cost of getting 
a σ  trait mismatch at remarriage overshadows the potential gain of a grater 
productivity trait match.     
  To sum up, when preferences over participation are important enough, they 
dominate couples’ decisions about divorce and crowd out the ‘productivity 
mismatch’ effects. If preferences are coordinated by the conscious mechanism this 
does not change the dynamics of the model because this trait then generates its own 
transitory rise in divorce. However if this trait is coordinated by the subconscious 
mechanism it does not have a transitory effect. Then as it crowds out ‘productivity 
mismatch’ so is the transitory effect caused by productivity mismatch. This 
development is more consistent with the empirical divorce and remarriage rates 
seen in a number of countries and also consistent with a number of empirical 
studies that find that preferences over participation are more important causes of 
divorce than productivity mismatch.  
 
8. Concluding remarks 
Our paper shows that Becker’s basic productivity trait model of marriage is at odds 
with empirical evidence on two fronts and is presents a simple extension of the 
model with a subconscious coordination mechanism based on sociological theory, 
which realigns its predictions.  
In Becker’s productivity trait model changing social conditions may 
induce a permanent rise in the divorce rate when coordination errors are larger for 
the set of traits that affect outcome in the new social situation. However, such a 
shift also causes a temporary increase in divorce rates when conscious rational 
‘economic’ coordination mechanism ensures trait coordination. The mechanism FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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implies that, at the time of marriage, partners refrain from coordinating traits that 
they expect not to be important for outcomes. In the transition period divorce rates 
increase because couples, that were well-matched at marriage under the old social 
conditions, are now mismatched in the new social situation. This effect disappears 
again once cohorts married under the old social conditions pass on (or coordinates 
under the new regime through divorce and subsequent remarriage). Hereafter, 
divorce rates are affected only by cohorts that have also married under the new 
regime. 
  We accept the utility perspective used by economists, but not the general 
(universal) applicability of conscious rational choice model of behavior. Instead we 
introduce a subconscious coordination mechanism for preferences over women’s 
labour market participation. This coordination mechanism works at the time of the 
marriage even when partners consider them irrelevant for outcomes. Whereas this 
mechanism does not contribute to the temporary rise in divorce rates, it will, to the 
extent that it is imperfect, contribute to the permanent rise. It may even (if it is 
strong enough) crowd out temporary effects caused by the productivity traits 
coordinated by a conscious evaluation mechanism, that is characteristic of 
economic models of marriage. When this is the case our model also predicts that 
preference mismatch is the dominant cause of divorce. Thus, our extension of 
Becker’s model produces predictions that are consistent with both the dynamics of 
divorce and the causes of divorce that we observe in a number of countries. While 
extensions in the economic tradition may also be able to produce consistent 
dynamic predictions (an example of this might be Chiappori and Weiss, 2006), 
there is potential for extensions inspired by sociological theory, which the literature 
formally modeling divorce and marriage largely overlooks. Thus, to facilitate a 
more precise understanding of the historical trends, empirical studies designed with 
the explicit purpose of investigating and testing implications of the sociological 
perspective presents promising area for future research.  
  
Appendix: A simulation model of the marriage market  FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
 
  33
The model simulates partners matching in a marriage market with search costs and 
uncertain estimation of traits by partners.  
  Utility of a household is as defined in equation (1): 
 
 (( ) ,( ) ) mm ww w w m m UWt wt H Tt Tt ββ αα =+ + − − 
 
where the household production function is given the specific form  
(.) ( ) ( ) ww mm H Tt Tt K αα =− + − + where K is a positive gain from marriage 
reflecting complementarities in household production and the variable elements 
reflecting input substitution possibilities at the margin in household production. The 
man’s wage W is set so that at the models parameter values it is always optimal for 
the male to work full time (i.e.  m tt T =<) while it may be optimal for women to 
work less than full time or not at all. Given wage rates (W,w) and  trait values 
( ,,, wwkk β α β α ) the optimal value of  w t  for any couple (which we denote  
*
w t ) can 
be found and the households utility calculated. The utility of a single’s household is 
found by setting t =T for the partner and K to zero and optimizing labor supply. 
  To simplify the solution of the model we assume that men are residual 
claimants and that men must give women their utility share in the woman’s optimal 
marriage (i.e. equal to utility of her staying-single option plus the woman’s 
marginal contribution to the optimal marriage). Only males endure search costs and 
the man’s decision problem is to weigh the expected gain from continued search 
against the cost of continued search. If there were no search costs in the market all 
men would continue searching until they by chance meet their optimal match. We 
assume that men know the distribution of women’s  , ww β α  traits in the market and 
so are able to evaluate the expected gain from continued search, and so for each 
man we can calculate a span of acceptable woman trait values (conditional on the 
current wage rate). When a man meets a woman whose traits fall within this span 
they enter into marriage (with the woman receiving a utility share equal to her share 
in optimum and so this marriage is also acceptable to her). The random meeting 
process with search costs generates a number of marriages and some men and FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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women who by design or chance remain single. Search costs may make it 
unprofitable for some men to search for a partner (if the gains from marriage in 
their optimal marriage are relatively small). This automatically implies that an equal 
number of women (primarily those with matching attributes) also remain single. 
Also some men remain single by chance because their optimal partners have been 
taken by others who decided to stop searching before finding their optimal partner.  
  We simulate partner search, marriage and divorce for men with participation 
preference trait normalized to zero ( 0 σ = ) among an equal number of women. 
Without coordination on this trait we assume the probability of mismatch is 0.6.  
This probability is reduced to 0.4 with coordination irrespective of this coordination 
being conscious or subconscious. Conscious coordination at marriage occurs when 
the trait affects realized marriage outcomes in the social conditions applying at the 
time of marriage. The resulting mismatch then is a result of partners observing the 
trait imperfectly. Subconscious coordination at marriage occurs irrespective of 
whether the trait affects realized marriage outcomes in the social conditions 
applying at the time of marriage. Coordination happens through a subconscious 
process that does not involve a utility calculation – but when it coordinates 
perfectly, it results in a coordination that is consistent with utility maximization if 
the trait were to affect realized marriage outcomes. If a couple has incompatible 
preference traits then the male must still compensate the female according to her 
optimal marriage either by allowing in-optimal (from his perspective) labor market 
participation or by compensating her for accepting in-optimal (from her 
perspective) labor market participation. We simulate this by calculating household 
utility using a woman’s labor supply be set at 
*
w t λσ +  whereλ indicates the 
strength of the preference trait effect (i.e. in the Becker model  0 λ = ). This captures 
the utility loss endured by the husband associated with incompatible preference 
traits.  
 We assume that males observe female traits  , ww β α  with error and 
that these are always subject to conscious coordination. Men are assumed to know 
the distribution of the estimation errors and to take into account the probability of 
preference trait mismatch when marrying. If preference trait coordination is FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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conscious this corresponds to the way other traits are taken into account when 
marriage/divorce decisions are made. If preference trait coordination is 
subconscious, the uncertainty associated with this trait is not identified as such but 
rather perceived as a general uncertainty about the realized outcome from engaging 
in a new marriage. Following Becker, the basic assumption is that the market tends 
toward the optimal sorting after expected utilities (i.e. given the assumed trait 
observation uncertainties). Thus, we assume that men and women know the utility 
level of their own staying-single option and their own expected marginal 
contribution to the marriage dictated by the optimal sorting (calculated as expected 
utility for observed trait values and current wage rates with expectations taken over 
the trait estimation error and the unobserved preference  trait characteristic 
distributions).  
  As marriages unfold wage rates change and new spans of acceptable traits are 
calculated for all men. Then women’s traits are realized/observed, and for some 
men it turns out that at the new wage rates and realized/observed traits including the 
preference trait characteristic the realized utility level is so low that renewed search 
becomes optimal and so divorce results (since women must receive a utility share 
corresponding to what they would receive in their new optimal marriage the man’s 
expected gains from continued search are now greater than his search costs). 
  The men's wage productivity  m β  is fixed and equal ( 2.5 m β = ) while the male 
household productivity trait and the female’s wage and household productivity are 
drawn from a uniform distribution ( m α  with a mean of 1 and a span of 0.5, w α  and 
w β  with a mean of 2 and a span of 0.1). In addition, an observation error for the two 
female traits is drawn from a uniform distribution with mean 0 and a span as 
indicated bellow in table 3. The men’s wage rate W is 1 in all simulations so the 
women’s wage rate w is the wage relative to men’s. In the before wage-rise 
situation w is 0.8 while w is 1 in the after wage-rise situation. There are 30 men and 
30 women in each market and search costs are set so that four women are 
acceptable to each man in the initial marriage market situation where the K 
parameter is set so that the male in the least productive marriage just prefers 
marriage to remaining single. We have aggregated results for three different FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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markets differing only in the random trait drawings for males and females. The 
before wage-increase divorce rate is simulated by letting partners marry and divorce 
at the woman’s wage rate w=0.8, the just after wage-rise divorce rate is simulated 
by letting partners marry at w=0.8 and divorce at w=1.0 while the long after wage-
increase divorce rate is calculated by letting partners marry and divorce at the 
woman’s wage rate w=0.8. 
  We conduct all simulations for the same sample of 90 men and 90 women 
organized in three markets of 30 pairs each. We simulate the model with SAS using 
the NLP procedure to find the optimal match sorting and drawing traits and errors 
using the standard random number generator provided by SAS (the program is 
available on request). The table gives specific parameter values for the simulation 
runs presented in tables 1 and 2. 
 




w α and 











w β  
estimation 
error 
Proportion of  
lifestyle trait  




Proportion of  
lifestyle trait  




Value of  





No. 1 Table 
1 
0.9 0.000003  0.000003  -  -  0.00 
No. 2 Table 
1 
0.5 0.000003  0.000003  -  -  0.00 
No. 3 Table 
1 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  -  -  0.00 
No. 4 Table 
1 
0.5 0.000003  0.0003  -  -  0.00 
No. 1 Table 
2 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4    (Concious)  0.6  0.00 
No. 2 Table 
2 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4    (Concious)  0.6  0.02 
No. 3 Table 
2 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4    (Concious)  0.6  0.05 
No. 4 Table 
2 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4    (Concious)  0.6  0.13 FOI Working Paper 2010/4 
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No. 1 Table 
3 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4   
(Subconcious) 
0.6 0.00 
No. 2 Table 
3 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4   
(Subconcious) 
0.6 0.02 
No. 3 Table 
3 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4   
(Subconcious) 
0.6 0.05 
No. 4 Table 
3 
0.5 0.000003  0.00003  0.4   
(Subconcious) 
0.6 0.13 
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